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POLICE INITIATED EMERGENCY PSYCHIATRIC
DETENTION IN MICHIGAN
1. THE MICHIGAN STATUTE
While performing his duties a police officer may frequently be
confronted with the behavior of an individual which threatens or
has resulted in self-inflicted injury,' or which poses an imminent
threat to the safety of others. 2 Under such circumstances an
officer may determine that criminal arrest is inappropriate but that
some form of restraint is necessary. Michigan has provided an
alternative course of action by authorizing temporary emergency
psychiatric detention of an individual whom a police officer deems
to be "mentally ill and manifesting homicidal or other dangerous
tendencies." 3
Unfortunately, this emergency power has been invoked under
state statutes similar to the Michigan law when the officer's con-
clusions as to sanity and dangerousness were unjustified and the
I See, e.g., Orvis v. Brickman, 196 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952), where an officer
responding to a call discovered a woman bleeding profusely from cuts on her wrists. She
claimed that she accidentally cut herself with a razor blade while removing a callus from
her foot but added that she was glad the accident occurred and regretted that she was
discovered. An inspection of her feet revealed no callus. The officer then invoked the
police power and transported the woman to a hospital for a psychiatric examination.
2 See, e.g., Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis:
An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 485, 507 (1968), in which the author reports an
incident observed in Washington, where the officers responded to a call from an individual
claiming that her neighbor had chased her with a hatchet. During questioning, the hatch-
et-wielding suspect stated: "This is the hatchet Mr. Robinson used to kill me. I died once.
I do not know how I came back into this world." The officers in this instance were able to
locate the suspect's family and thus elected not to invoke the police power to detain the
individual.
a MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971):
Any peace officer of this state with the approval of the prosecuting attor-
ney, obtained within 24 hours of the taking into custody and confinement, is
authorized to take into temporary protective custody and confine in any
veteran's hospital, state hospital, or any licensed hospital in the state or some
other place which shall be designated by the county or district health officer
or mental health authority but not to include the county jail, for the purpose
of confinement and medical or psychiatric treatment excluding shock treat-
ment for a period of not to exceed 48 hours, not counting Sundays and legal
holidays, a person believed to be mentally ill manifesting homicidal or other
dangerous tendencies. Proceedings under this act, temporary or permanent,
shall be instituted within 48 hours, not counting Sundays and legal holidays.
Nationwide, police are involved in about one-fourth of all psychiatric hospitalizations.
Their participation takes two forms: that of direct intervention, the focus of this article,
where as a result of on-the-street encounters they initiate psychiatric hospitalization; and
that of secondary involvement where upon request of others initiating commitment pro-
ceedings they assist in transporting the patient to the proper facility. R. ROCK, M. JACOB-
SON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968).
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subsequent detention therefore unlawful. 4 This suggests that sim-
ilar problems arise in Michigan. Thus, while in some situations the
statute may offer an alternative to the possible neglect, 5 or con-
versely, to the criminal incarceration of the mentally ill, 6 in others
emergency psychiatric detention may raise numerous issues of
both practical and constitutional dimensions.
The statute provides for forty-eight hour emergency psychiatric
detention. 7 Upon concluding that a person is mentally ill and
4 Numerous cases indicate questionable decisions by police officers regarding the impo-
sition of restraints upon those they conclude are dangerously mentally ill. See, e.g., Collins
v. Jones, 131 Cal. App. 747, 22 P.2d 39 (1933), where a mother whose young son had
been missing for about six months had refused, after caring for almost three weeks for a
child found by the police, to accept the child as her own. After unsuccessfully attempting
to convince the woman that the child was her son, a police officer, doubting her sanity, had
her detained at a psychiatric ward. The officer was later held liable for false imprisonment.
In Whaley v. Jansen, 208 Cal. App. 2d 222, 25 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1962), a man distributing
an inflammatory letter pursued a door-to-door campaign attempting to expose wrongdoers
in government. He voiced his grievances and boldly requested the use of homes to call and
gather neighbors to attend his lectures and fund solicitations. The officer answering the
complaint felt compelled to take affirmative action and chose temporary psychiatric deten-
tion rather than bringing criminal charges. The court upheld the police officer's use of
emergency detention under a California statute paralleling the Michigan law upon the
questionable finding that the officer had acted reasonably. Just as in most suits for false
criminal arrest, the court was reluctant to find that a police officer detained without
reasonable cause. This California code provision has since been repealed and replaced by
a modified version of the same statute, CAL. WELF. AND INsT'NS CODE § 5150-2 (West
197 1), which more explicitly spells out post admission procedures and safeguards.
See also Brecka v. State, 14 Misc. 2d 317, 179 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1958), where an
officer invoked the police power to restrain a woman and bring her before a health officer
for examination. The woman had refused to stop burning wood on property the officer
believed belonged to another. In fact the woman had owned the property for five years and
had even acquired the necessary burning permit. The court nevertheless found that the
officer had probable cause for the detention.
An interesting unpublished 1960 case where a police officer seemingly abused the
psychiatric detention power is reported in Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Com-
mitment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 383, 384 (1962). In this particular case a Polish
immigrant, living with her husband in Chicago, discovered money had been stolen from
their apartment. Suspecting the janitor as the culprit, since he possessed the only other key
to the apartment, she proceeded to his room and demanded he return the money. The
janitor responded by calling the police and upon their arrival stated that the husband and
wife were both insane and should be committed to a mental institution. Without any
further examination the police seized the couple and took them in handcuffs to Cook
County Mental Health Clinic. At the institution, unable to answer questions in English and
thereby to defend themselves, the pair were duly pronounced mentally ill. Six weeks later
the husband hung himself. See Willie, Why Refugee Asked for Ticket to Russia, Daily
News, Mar. 29, 1962, at 10, col. 1.
See also Whaley v. Kirby, 208 Cal. App. 2d 232, 25 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1962).
5 There may be instances where the police officer will simply ignore the behavior of
persons who are apparently mentally ill though indications of their behavior reveal possible
future danger. See Matthews, Observations on Police Policy and Procedures for Emer-
gency Detention of the Mentally I1, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 283, 284 (1970).
6 Unless there is an emergency detention statute, an individual may find himself con-
fined to a cell for having committed a minor offense such as disturbing the peace, when in
fact mental illness was clearly the cause of his behavior. Psychiatric attention is needed
rather than punishment. See Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N. CAR. L.
REV. 274, 285 (1953).
7 While other methods of initiating emergency psychiatric detention without the prelimi-
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manifesting homicidal or other dangerous tendencies, in other
words, that his presence on the street endangers his own life or
the lives of others, the police officer may lawfully invoke the
statutory power. 8 Having made this determination, the policeman
will transport the person to any licensed hospital in the state,
private9 or public, 10 where a doctor will conduct an exam-
ination to determine whether the individual's mental condition
merits hospitalization. Such examinations, while extrmely signifi-
cant to detention procedures, are not required by the statute but
are carried out pursuant to hospital policy.'1 Additionally, at some
time during the first twenty-four hours of detention the police
officer must obtain the approval of the prosecuting attorney to
legitimize his course of action.' 2 Finally, unless the officer com-
mences an involuntary commitment proceeding by petitioning the
probate court within forty-eight hours of detention, the detainee
must be released.' 3
Theoretically, the hospital admission policy and the prose-
cuting attorney's approval serve as screening devices, eliminating
the possibility of wrongful detention. However, in practice similar
"safeguards" have proved ineffective in other states as the deten-
tion power has been used in non-emergency situations, 14 and
there is little reason to believe that such is not the case in Mich-
igan. Thus an individual may be detained for a forty-eight hour
period and subjected to psychiatric treatment1 5 when there was, in
fact, no legal basis for his detention.
Furthermore, despite the absence of statutory authorization, it
appears that in many instances an individual for whom an officer
has instituted involuntary commitment proceedings within the
forty-eight hour statutory period may actually be detained until
the commencement of his commitment hearing, a period that
frequently exceeds the forty-eight hour maximum detention. 16 It
also appears that forty-eight hour detention is frequently con-
verted into five day detention upon the certificate of a city or
county physician under the questionable authority of another stat-
nary safeguard of a hearing are provided in addition to police initiated detention by MICH.
COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 330.19 (Supp. 1971), they are beyond the scope of this article.
8 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971).
9 For special concerns arising from the use of private hospitals see note 54 infra.
1 0 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971).
11 See notes 40-48 and accompanying text infra.
12 MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a)(Supp. 1971).
13 Id.
14 See note 4 supra.
15 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971) authorizes detention "for the
purpose of confinement and medical or psychiatric treatment excluding shock treatment."
16 See notes 51-52 and accompanying text infra.
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utory provision,1 7 thus undermining the specific time restrictions
imposed upon police detention. That such possibilities exist in-
dicate the need for reevaluation of the present statutory scheme
and consideration of additional procedural safeguards to assure
compliance with constitutional protections.
11. THE PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE
A. The Initial Encounter
The combination of vague statutory language and a police
officer's limited qualifications as a diagnostician18 present serious
problems in applying the Michigan statute. The language authoriz-
ing detention of those believed to be mentally ill and manifesting
homicidal or other dangerous tendencies in essence endows the
police officer with a broad discretionary power; it is simply un-
clear what behavior falls within the literal language of the statute.
Moreover, the statute does not specify whether the police officer
himself must witness some aspect of the deviant behavior. 19 It
may be argued, and one court has in fact suggested, that the
officer's belief that the individual is mentally ill and has mani-
fested dangerous tendencies may be based on the testimony of
witnesses. 20 The questionable reliability of witnesses under these
circumstances 2 1makes such a procedure suspect in the absence of
an opportunity for the detainee to confront them.
17 See notes 53-54 and accompanying text infra.
18 Matthews suggests that the average police officer is no more qualified to judge an
individual's mental health than is the average citizen:
In making decisions concerning persons who are or are thought to be men-
tally ill, a policemen's perception is nearly identical with that of the ordinary
lay person of a similar age and background. Generally, the training the police
receive in handling mentally ill persons is limited to cataloging major psy-
chological symptoms that mentally ill persons display and learning to handle
violently abnormal people.
Matthews, supra note 5, at 288.
19 The statute authorizes detention by a police officer of an individual "believed to be"
mentally ill and manifesting homicidal or other dangerous tendencies. There is no restric-
tive language indicating that this belief must be based on first hand observation, and the
terminology seems to invite reliance on witnesses when an officer arrives after a disturb-
ance. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971).20 See Whaley v. Jansen, 208 Cal. App. 2d 222, 229, 25 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188 (1962),
where the court interpreted a California statute similar to that presently in force in
Michigan and concluded that "reasonable cause to believe" did not limit the officer's
authority to detain to situations where he personally witnessed the occurrences:
The authority contained in [the detention statute] does not confine the test of
reasonable cause to acts committed in the presence of the officers. In deter-
mining whether there was reasonable cause for an arrest without a warrant,
police officers are justified in taking into account the past conduct, character
and reputation of the person suspected.
21 Often family members will call the police not because they feel endangered or feel an
[VOL. 5:3
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Even when a police officer's first hand observation reveals
peculiar or seemingly abnormal behavior, the average officer may
not be capable of discerning mental illness or of distinguishing
mental illness as the source of aberrational conduct from in-
ebriation or drug use. Perhaps more significantly, the prevalence
of symptoms of mental illness in the members of society at large
casts serious doubt on the usefulness of the very label of mental
illness he attempts to apply. 22 It may well be that mental illness is
too elusive a criterion to be utilized by a non-professional when
important rights are at stake. Additional problems in applying the
statute arise in that the officer may be unable to identify homicidal
or other dangerous tendencies in the absence of the actual com-
mission of a crime. It has been suggested that a police officer
would prefer to invoke the detention power rather than to arrest a
person in certain borderline cases where grounds for criminal
arrest are questionable or non-existent. 23
Furthermore, it is arguable that the police officer is not held to
an objective standard of reasonableness in invoking this dis-
cretionary detention power. The Michigan statute merely requires
the "belief' of the officer. 24 In light of the fact that the officer's
decision to detain results in a forced deprivation of liberty that in
many cases is equally as objectionable to the detainee as arrest is
to an alleged criminal offender, there seems to be little justification
for applying other than the objective standard of probable cause
arrest is necessary but rather because they can no longer tolerate the presence of the sick
individual. Matthews, supra note 5, at 290.
22 A study conducted in New York City based on a home survey in Manhattan
disclosed revealing statistics regarding the' presence of symptoms of mental illness in the
general population. Several categories of severity were established. Fewer than one in five
of those individuals surveyed- 18 percent-appeared free of significant symptoms of
mental pathology; 58.1 percent were categorized as mild or moderately symptomatic of
mental illness; and 23.4 percent were classified as mentally impaired. L. SROLE, T.
LANGER, S. MICHAELS, M. OPLER & T. RENNIE, MENTAL HEALTH IN THE METROPOLIS
138 (1962). Another study revealed that one-tenth of the non-hospitalized population
exhibited "obvious mental illness." Pasamanick, Roberts, Lemkav, & Kruger, A Survey of
Mental Disease in an Urban Population: Prevalence by Race and Income, in MENTAL
HEALTH OF THE POOR 39, 48 (F. Riessman ed. 1964). Statistics that reveal such a large
portion of the populace displaying significant symptoms of mental illness not only indicate
the difficulty an officer faces in determining mental illness as a causative factor of behavior
but also suggest the dubious nature of the mental illness label itself.
23 Faced with a persistently troublesome minor offender, the officer might resort to
emergency psychiatric detention which could conceivably result in commitment for an
undetermined period rather than make an arrest for vagrancy or disturbing the peace which
could result at most in a ninety day loss of liberty. Similarly, an aroused officer might
invoke the detention power to disrupt the incitive activities of a political antagonist in a
seemingly volatile situation where no crime has been committed.
24 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971). It is arguable that a requirement
of reasonableness is implicit in this provision and thus that the. standard is objective.
Nevertheless, use of the term "belief" clearly seems to import a subjective standard.
SPRING 1972]
Journal of Law Reform [VoL. 5:3
required for lawful arrest. 25 The common law required objective
probable cause or at least the objective standard of a reasonable
cause to believe one was mentally ill and dangerous before an
officer could invoke the police power to detain.2 6 If the standard
of the Michigan statute is subjective, then it may encourage police
utilization of the detention power because of the virtual impossi-
bility of establishing abuse of discretion, but the adoption of such
a subjective standard does little to encourage the cautious,
thoughtful utilization of an emergency power that may result in
such serious consequences. 27
B. Approval of the Prosecutor
The Michigan statute requires that the prosecuting attorney
approve the detention within twenty-four hours of its inception2 8
In Detroit the practice has developed whereby the police officer
normally phones the prosecutor's office from the scene of the
disturbance to receive the necessary approval for detention.2 9 The
25 The mere belief that an individual has committed a crime cannot justify his arrest
under the standards established in Beck v. Ohio, 389 U.S. 89, 91 (1964):
Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether
at the moment the arrest was made, the officer had probable cause to make it,
that is, whether at that moment the facts and circumstnaces within his
knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had com-
mitted or was committing an offense.
The extension of the probable cause standard to emergency detention situations seems
compelling in light of the resultant police initiated loss of liberty:
The test as to reasonable grounds for making an arrest for a felony without a
warrant was described ... as follows: "Proper cause for arrest has often been
defined to be a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the
accused to be guilty."
The reasoning inherent in the foregoing statement seems equally applicable
to the case of apprehension of a person purportedly "so mentally ill as to be
unsafe to be at large."
Plancich v. Williamson, 57 Wash. 2d 367, 373, 357 P.2d 693, 696 (1960) (citation
omitted).26 See, e.g., Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90 (1879); Crawford v. Brown, 321
111. 305, 151 N.E. 911 (1926); see also the compilation of cases in Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d
570 (1963).
27 The police officer should not use the detention power under the assumption that an
error in his judgment will be rectified by a later professional examination of the detainee:
The layman usually assumes that his conception of mental illness is not the
important definition, since the psychiatrist is the expert and presumably
makes the final decision. On the contrary, committed persons are brought to
the hospital on the basis of lay definitions and once they arrive their appear-
ance alone is usually regarded as sufficient evidence of illness.
Mechanic, Some Factors in Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, 46 MENTAL HY-
GIENE 66, 67 (1962).
28 MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 1971).
29 Interview with Peter Karpathian, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Wayne
County, in Detroit, Mich., Jan. 14, 1972.
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prosecutor, hardly an impartial neutral adjudicator, logs the time,
the date, and the police officer's version of the incident and makes
a decision as to the propriety of detention on the sole basis of this
phoned report. The police officer thereby obtains the approval of
the prosecutor prior to any hospital examination of the detainee.
Thus the requisite approval of the prosecuting attorney is ren-
dered a meaningless formality that can prevent wrongful detention
in only the most glaring cases. The prosecutor's office in Detroit
has indicated that many police officers prefer this method of
approval since the possibility of any liability for abuse of dis-
cretion is immediately shifted to the prosecutor's office.30 While
this may minimize the detaining officer's fears of civil liability, the
victim of an illegal detention will find little solace in this arrange-
ment, as it is doubtful that any civil liability for violation of the
statute will rest in the prosecutor's office. 3 '
A different method of gaining the approval of the prosecutor
was previously used in Detroit3 2 and may still be used in districts
outside of that city. The procedure developed whereby a doctor at
the detaining hospital telephoned the prosecutor to confirm the
policeman's initial diagnosis of mental illness and dangerous-
ness.33 Without hospital confirmation the prosecutor would not
grant his approval, and the police officer would be forced ei-
ther to resort to criminal charges or to terminate custody.3 4
While such a practice may appear to satisfy the need for an
effective safeguard against invalid detention by revitalizing the
prosecutor's approval as a viable screening device, the procedure
has several shortcomings. The questionable reliability of the ad-
mitting doctor's diagnosis seriously diminishes the effectiveness of
this practice.3 5 Furthermore, by relying on the admitting doctor's
determination this process merely duplicates the only other exist-
ing safeguard, that of hospital admission, rather than serving as an
independent check.
30 Id. The possibility of civil liability for abuse of discretion would seemingly arise only
if a court were to hold that the statute imposes upon the officer an objective standard of
reasonableness.
31 In Kenny v. Killian, 133 F.Supp. 571 (W.D. Mich. 1955), the defendant Michigan
prosecuting attorney, who had approved the confinement of the plaintiff under the Mich-
igan detention statute after a police officer had represented that the plaintiff was insane and
manifesting homicidal or other dangerous tendencies, was held immune from civil liability.
The decision rested on the fact that the defendant had rendered his approval in the good
faith exercise of his discretion as prosecuting attorney and had acted within the scope of
his statutory authority.
32 Interview with Judge Ernest C. Boehm, Wayne County Probate Judge, in Detroit,
Mich., Jan. 14, 1972.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See note 48 infra.
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Finally, it is important to note that there may be a substantial
period of time between the original detention of the individual by
the police officer and the determination by the hospital as to
whether the individual should be admitted for treatment. In fact,
the Director of the Emergency Department of Detroit General
Hospital has suggested that an individual brought to that in-
stitution under the detention statute will receive no examination
priority unless he is violent or uncontrollable.36 Otherwise, it
appears that he must wait with the police officer until he is called
for examination in the regular emergency ward rotation, a time
consuming delay that is compounded by the tremendous backlog
of patients awaiting attention at the overcrowded facility.3 7 Fur-
thermore, no psychiatric care or diagnosis is conducted until the
detainee has undergone a complete physical examination, a pro-
cess which might take well over three hours. 38 As a result, in
practice a detainee is in custody for a significant period of time
under adverse circumstances and subjected to a physical exam-
ination before a psychiatrist ever evaluates his mental capacity or
would be in a position to verify the police officer's judgment to the
prosecuting attorney. 39 Thus, even if the prosecuting attorney
were to require psychiatric diagnosis before rendering approval,
that diagnosis might not be possible for an extended period of
time and, therefore, this mode of approval does not eliminate all
of the evils of unauthorized detention.
C. Admission to the Hospital
The manner in which the prosecutor approves of emergency
detention indicates that if there is any effective check on the
police officer's discretionary decision to invoke the detention
power it must occur after the detainee is brought to the emer-
gency ward where the hospital conducts its initial examination to
determine whether the detainee's condition in fact necessitates
hospitalization. 40 However, in actual practice, the criteria for hos-
36 Interview with Dr. Ronald L. Krome, Director, Emergency Department, Detroit
General Hospital, Detroit, Mich., Jan. 14, 1972.
37 Id.
38 Id.
3 In many instances this delay has the additional undesirable result of removing an
officer from the streets for a substantial period of time. It appears that officers frequently
feel that their responsibility for the detainee continues until an admission decision is made.
However, it was noted by the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office that in localities where
fewer officers are on duty the necessity of adequately patrolling the streets would, as a
rule, preclude an officer's remaining with the detainee.
40 Speaking of the situation in Washington, D.C., Dix states that only one-third of those
[VOL. 5:3
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pitalization may be different from those established for the origi-
nal detention. The hospital will give a general psychiatric exam-
ination to detect mental illness, and it appears that this need not
reveal manifestations of homicidal or other dangerous tendencies
to meet hospital admission requirements. 41 Even if a diagnosis of
dangerousness is a prerequisite to hospitalization, such a diag-
nosis may be ineffective as a safeguard, for some doctors appar-
ently feel requiring treatment is merely being helpful and thus
have little difficulty in concluding that a detainee who is suffering
from any form of mental illness is likely to injure himself or others
because of his illness. 42 Moreover, a doctor's ability to make a
determination of dangerousness that would satisfy legal standards
is highly questionable. 43 In any event, there are strong indications
that the quality of these psychiatric examinations at large state
hospitals is so inadequate that a reliable diagnosis may be the
exception rather than the rule.44 The existence of a lesser stan-
presented to the acute facility were admitted to full time hospitalization and concludes that
the admission procedure constitutes a significant safeguard. See Dix, supra note 2, at 520.
See also Matthews, supra note 5, at 290-9 1.
41 Interview with Dr. Ronald L. Krome, supra note 36.
42 This may be a common response of doctors who view forced psychiatric care in terms
of benefits to a patient rather than in terms of an individual's loss of liberty. See Comment,
Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1966).
43 The ability to predict suicidal behavior with any degree of accuracy is extremely
questionable and has been frequently debated among members of the medical profession.
There are those who contend that there are no valid psychological test indicators capable
of predicting future suicidal behavior. Piotrowski, Psychological Test Predictions of Sui-
cide, in SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR, DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 198, 199 (H. Resnick ed.
1968).
Equally difficult to predict is dangerousness:
"Dangerousness," then, cannot in any sense be regarded as a clinically
observable symptom of a proposed patient. ... In short, psychiatric pre-
dictions of "dangerousness" to others are at least as tenuous as predictions of
serious self destructive tendencies. As one study of patients who had com-
mitted homicide concluded:
[11n extremely few cases was there anything that would enable the
psychiatrist to predict accurately the subsequent ... offense.... [T]he
discipline of psychology has not yet developed valid criteria of
sufficient degree of predictive reliability to justify hard and fast dis-
tinctions, before the act, between the ... [mentally ill] individual who
is likely to commit ... violence such as rape or homicide, and the one
who will not translate this emotional conflict into aggressive destruc-
tive behavior.
Dix, supra note 2, at 527 (citations omitted).
In Guttmacher, A Review of Cases Seen by a Court Psychiatrist, in THE CLINICAL
EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 17, 27 (J. Rappeport ed.
1967), a court psychiatrist concluded on the basis of case studies of six parties who
committed homicide that he was "unable to decipher in these cases any symptoms which
they presented in common that might act as warning signs of impending disaster."
44 In a discussion dealing with the examination process that may result in a physician's
certification of insanity, one authority described the inadequacies of present practices:
The flaw is that the so called "examinations" are made on an assembly-line
basis, often being completed in two or three minutes and never taking more
than ten minutes. Although psychiatrists agree that it is practically impos-
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dard for admission, the inherent uncertainties of detecting dan-
gerousness, and the questionable quality of the examination limit
the value of hospital admission as a safeguard against unlawful
detention.
Some authorities have further pointed out that a doctor at-
tempting to determine the mental status of the detainee may be
influenced by the very fact of his detention and the accompanying
reports of his actions, in other words, that these factors create a
suggestive atmosphere for the psychiatric examination. 45 Indeed
the situation is more suggestive than the non-emergency com-
mitment examination, for here the doctor is dealing with detention
based on what he believes is the unbiased report of a specific
incident by an objective observer, the police officer, rather than
with detention arising from the non-emergency written application
of family or individuals 46 whom he realizes may conceivably have
ulterior motives for desiring permanent commitment.4 7 Also,
non-medical influences are more likely to have an effect on the
limited examinations that determine the necessity of temporary
hospitalization than on the extensive psychiatric examination or-
dered by a court to determine the need for actual commitment for
a possibly indeterminant period of time.48
sible to determine a person's sanity on the basis of such a short and hurried
interview, doctors at the Mental Health Clinic recommend confinement in
77% of the cases.; It appears that in practice the alleged-mentally-ill is
presumed to be insane and bears the burden of proving his sanity in the few
minutes allotted to him.
Kutner, supra note 4, at 385.
Additionally, it may be noted that MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(a) (Supp. 197 1)
authorizes the officer to bring a detainee to private hospitals as well as to state hospitals.
It may be significant that such institutions are not supported by state funds and depend
on the fees received for the extended care of patients for their very existence. Therefore,
"whenever a doubt as to a patient's condition would arise, it would probably be resolved in
favor of his further detention." See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally II, 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 668, 680 (1959).
45 Unfortunately, the officer's report of the incident does not merely serve as a basis for
examination, but may, in effect, be conclusive of the detainee's mental condition:
Both the abstract nature of the physician's theories and the time limitations
imposed upon him by the institutional structure of which he is a part make it
impossible for him to make a rapid study of the patient's illness, or even to
ascertain if illness in fact exists. Instead it becomes necessary for him to
assume the illness of the patient and to apply some label to the alleged, if not
recognized symptoms. The consequences are that the basic decision about
illness usually occurs prior to the patient's admission to the hospital and the
decision is more or less made by a non-professional member of the commu-
nity.
Mechanic, supra note 27, at 69. See also Dix, supra note 2, at 509.
46 MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1971).
47 See note 21 supra.
48 See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1971).
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111. INADEQUACIES OF THE MICHIGAN STATUTE
The factual basis for a police officer's diagnosis of an in-
dividual's mental illness and dangerousness may remain un-
checked; the detainee may never have the opportunity to refute
the officer's conclusions. Furthermore, the detainee may have
been admitted to the hospital without a professional confirmation
of the likelihood of future dangerous behavior; even if a determi-
nation of dangerousness were to be required for admission there is
strong support for the contention that the reliability of such a
determination would be dubious at best. 49
If a hearing were to be held immediately after the detainee's
admission to the hospital to substantiate the officer's report before
any further action could be instituted in reliance upon it, summary
detention, even though arguably based upon a vague subjective
standard, might not prove so distasteful. However, such is not the
present practice, for at this point psychiatric treatment may imme-
diately begin and the detention has, in effect, been deemed lawful.
Proponents of the present statutory scheme would argue that this
brief forty-eight hour detention is justified when used to determine
whether commitment proceedings should be instituted by the po-
lice officer, especially when the alternative to such detention is the
freedom of a potentially dangerous individual. They would con-
tend that even were the statutory and practical safeguards
effective in distinguishing the mentally ill from the mentally ill
who are dangerous, upon the detainee's release for failing to meet
the statutory criteria of dangerousness, an officer who believed
that the individual was menatally defective could immediately
institute non-emergency involuntary commitment proceedings
that would only require a finding of mental illness to justify
institutionalization. 50 Thus, they would conclude, since the same
hearing will ultimately result regardless of whether the individual
is detained or not, the forty-eight hour detention is justified when
balanced against the safety of the individual and of the public.
While it is true that the officer is authorized to initiate non-
emergency involuntary commitment proceedings, it must be
emphasized that such proceedings involve no pre-hearing deten-
tion 51 -the allegedly insane individual is only required to appear
49 See note 43 supra.
50 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 197 1) authorizes a peace officer to petition
the probate court to commence involuntary commitment proceedings of a non-emergency
nature upon the belief that an individual is mentally ill.
5 The Michigan statute provides only that notice of the time and place of hearing be
SPRING 1972]
Journal of Law Reform[
in court on the designated day. When contrasted with the realities
of emergency detention this fact underscores a primary defect in
the present statutory scheme. While the emergency statute
authorizes detention before the commencement of commitment
proceedings for a period not to exceed forty-eight hours, in reality
the loss of liberty may extend well beyond this statutory time
limit, for the statute ignores the disposition of the detainee be-
tween the time the officer has commenced the formal commit-
ment process and the date of the resultant hearing.5 2 Since the
court is dealing with an allegedly dangerous individual there is
little likelihood that he will be released pending his hearing. Thus,
in effect, the period of preventive detention may extend well
beyond the statutory limit once emergency detention has been
authorized and commitment proceedings begun. If this is not the
case and detention is not extended until the date of the hearing the
statute makes little sense. The situation would develop whereby
an individual who was detained because his presence on the street
was deemed a danger to himself or others would be released at the
conclusion of forty-eight hours to pose the same threat until the
date of his hearing. Surely this was not the intent of the drafters.
In addition to this problem concerning the disposition of the
detainee between the commencement of commitment proceedings
and the hearing, it appears that the courts have frequently per-
mitted the extension of the forty-eight hour time limit for deten-
tion and the commencement of commitment proceedings upon the
certificate of an examining city or county physician. While statu-
tory provisions do provide for five day emergency detention upon
such a certificate 53 the language clearly indicates that this is to be
served on the individual at least twenty-four hours before the hearing, but does not
authorize prehearing detention. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1971).
52 The statute requires the police officer to petition the probate court within forty-eight
hours but fails to consider whether the detainee is then to be released pending his hearing
or kept in the hospital until the date of the hearing. There is a high probability that several
days will pass before the necessary examinations have been conducted and the proper
notice completed.
53 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.19(b) (Supp. 1971) states:
The regularly appointed official physician of any city or county who shall
find, after careful examination, that any person in such city or county is
mentally diseased and that the immediate detention of such person for exam-
ination, treatment and proceedings under this act, is necessary for public
safety or the safety of the individual, shall make a certificate to that effect,
which shall contain the facts and circumstances showing the mental condition
of such person and why such action is necessary, and deliver the same to any
peace officer of such city or county, who shall forthwith take such person
into custody and transfer him to a hospital for confinement, examination and
treatment or to some other place for detention if a hospital is not available, as
the physician may direct. Any person taken into custody and confined under
the provision of this section may be detained until proceedings as provided in
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utilized as a wholly separate means of instituting psychiatric de-
tention rather than as a mechanism to extend the time limit of
police initiated detention. Furthermore, the provisions authorizing
police detention state that "proceedings under this act, temporary
or permanent, shall be instituted by the police officer within forty-
eight hours." This language clearly indicates an intent to limit
the duration of police initiated detention, and the absence of any
provisions authorizing extension of the forty-eight hour limit sub-
stantiate this fact, especially in light of the specific language
providing for extension in other parts of the statute. 54 Thus it
seems that any extension authorized by a court of the forty-eight
hour time limit may be regarded as a purposeful evasion of the
statutory mandate.
Finally, the commitment hearing that will be ultimately con-
vened will implicitly presume the validity of the original detention,
dealing only with the question of legal sanity. 55 Thus, throughout
the entire process the initial determination of the detaining officer
may remain unreviewed despite the fact that it may result in a
significant deprivation of liberty for the detainee and expose him
to psychiatric treatment against his will. Due process seemingly
requires more effective safeguards as well as some opportunity to
challenge the basis of detention before it is deemed lawful and
leads to a serious loss of liberty.
It should be emphasized that the police officer's authority to
impose emergency psychiatric detention upon one clearly endan-
gering his own life or the lives of others is not questioned; the
police power clearly sanctions such detention. 56 It is generally
this act are instituted in the probate court but the period of confinement shall
not exceed 5 days ....
54 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.19(a) and (b) (Supp. 1971) both provide that the
period of detention shall not exceed five days unless the probate court by special order
extends the time.
55 The hearing deals solely with the question of mental illness, never considering the
validity of the original detention:
The court shall . . . take proofs as to the alleged mental condition ... of such
person, and fully investigate the facts, and if no jury is requested, the probate
court shall determine the question of such alleged mental disease of such
person. If it shall appear to the court or jury from evidence contained in the
doctor's certificates or from evidence produced in court that such person is
mentally diseased ....
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1971).
-1 It has been clearly established that due process is not violated by a temporary
confinement where immediate action is necessary and for the protection of others or for
the welfare of the alleged mentally ill person. See Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d 163,
317 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1971); In re Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, 173
N.E.2d 797 (1961). For other instances where the police power authorizes summary
action to protect the public without a prehearing, see American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of spoiled food); Ewing v. Mytinger and Cassel-
berry, Inc., 399 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vitamin products).
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agreed that emergency detention based on dangerous mental ill-
ness is a legitimate exception to the requirement of a hearing
preceeding any deprivation of liberty for reason of insanity. 57
However, the police power does not authorize any further denial
of the rights to which any other detainee would be entitled once
the supposed emergency has passed. 58 Thus, an equal protection
attack on the statute is based upon the contention that one who is
allegedly insane cannot be deprived of the right to challenge
involuntary detention that was initiated because his alleged ac-
tions have fallen within certain statutorily designated guidelines.
Just as the mentally competent suspect has the right to challenge
involuntary state detention based on prohibited acts, so should the
allegedly insane. There is no justification for the circumvention of
any procedural safeguards ordinarily provided to the criminal
arrestee when the psychiatric detainee seeks to challenge his
detention. 59 The statute should not be upheld upon the erroneous
assumption that it will only be invoked in situations where the
detainee is senseless or so seriously disturbed that he will be
unable or unwilling to challenge his detention.
Thus, when the claimed threat of danger has been overcome by
police intervention and the removal of the individual to the hospi-
tal, the need for summary action has passed and the detainee
immediately acquires the right to challenge the decision that
57 This belief, originating under the common law police power, see cases cited in note 26
supra, has been codified in most states by dispensing with the requirement of a
pre-detention hearing under emergency circumstances. For statutes paralleling the Mich-
igan law authorizing emergency police detention of the dangerously insane, see D.C. CODE
§ 21-521 (1967): ILL. ANN. STAT. § 7-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972); and N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 72 (McKinney 1971-72 Supp.).
58 Once the detainee has been removed to the hospital the emergency has ceased, since
doctors can provide medical attention unavailable at the point of public contact and the
legal apparatus exists to review the basis of detention. See Matthews, supra note 5, at 287.
After the detainee has been removed to the hospital, there is no longer a compelling reason
to deprive the detainee of the rights to which he is entitled if he possesses the com-
pentency to demand these rights.
59 In Fhagen v. Miller, 65 Misc. 2d 163, 317 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1971), plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of New York's emergency psychiatric detention statute,
arguing that a hearing was required for the question of the necessity for and propriety of
the emergency hospital admission. An intermediate appellate court reversed the findings of
the lower court and concluded that the habeas corpus provision of New York's Mental
Hygiene Law adequately protected the rights of the detainee, providing him with a means
for "reasonably testing" his emergency admission.
Initially it must be questioned whether habeas corpus adequately protects the detainee's
due process rights. Even if the petitioner is successful on his habeas petition, the detainee
has still undergone statutorily authorized treatment immediately upon his admission to the
hospital. Only a prior examination of the basis of detention can appropriately validate the
police officer's determination so that treatment may be commenced.
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resulted in his loss of liberty." In Goldberg v. Kelly61 the Su-
preme Court ruled that a recipient of public assistance payments
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the benefits are
terminated. The initial determination of a caseworker and her
superior could not alone justify the state's discontinuance of wel-
fare payments, and the recipient had a right to challenge the
determination. 62 Similarly, in the emergency detention situation
the initial determination by the police officer and admitting physi-
cian should not justify the state's commencement of detention or
the right of a hospital to begin treatment before the detainee has
had the right to challenge these determinations.
To meet the requirements of due process the Michigan non-
emergency involuntary commitment statutes provide that before
commitment is authorized there must be a legal review of the
medical determinations of insanity. No order for commitment may
be granted without judicial review of the propriety of the medical
findings. 63 It follows that the commencement of psychiatric treat-
ment and detention should not be permitted until a hearing, if
requested, has confirmed that the emergency detainee's actions
merited detention, that the approval of the prosecutor was more
than a perfunctory gesture, and that the admitting physician's
determinations resulted from a proper examination that in fact
revealed the dangerous tendencies of the patient as well as his
mental illness.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
The breakdown of the present safeguards against unlawful de-
60See, e.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), where the Supreme Court
stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an in-
dividual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the
evidence used to prove the government's case must be disclosed to the
individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is
important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important
where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory
may be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurors or persons motivated by
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice or jealousy. We have formal-
ized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and examination.
61 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
62 The Supreme Court confirmed the assessment of the lower court:
The stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility
for honest error or misjudgment too great to allow termination of aid without
giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully informed of the case
against him so that he may contest its basis and produce evidence in rebut-
tal.
397 U.S. 254 at 266.
63 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 197 1).
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tention and the need for some form of check on a police officer's
decision to detain necessitate modification of the statutory frame-
work. First, the statute should be amended to provide that a
police officer be held to an objective standard of reasonableness in
invoking the discretionary detention power. The present statutory
language, requiring merely the officer's "belief" that an individual
is mentally ill and dangerous, suggests that the standard is now
subjective.6 4 Such a modification would engender a higher degree
of caution in an officer's considering the invocation of the deten-
tion power, a caution possibly arising more from an increased
fear of civil liability for false arrest than from the language itself.
Second, provision should be made for an individual to challenge
his detention. This might best be accomplished by allowing the
detainee upon his admission to the hospital to question the valid-
ity of his detention before a magistrate, and requiring that the
police officer inform the detainee of such right. A hearing would
be held only upon the cognitive request of the detainee, alleviating
any fear of having to present the violent or insensible before the
court, while at the same time preserving the rights of those ca-
pable of questioning their loss of liberty.
This procedure would be established by amending the detention
statute to require the approval of a magistrate rather than that of a
prosecuting attorney. The judge could automatically approve
those whom the admitting doctor verified as violent or in-
sensible,6 5 but would require a hearing before granting approval in
all other cases where one was requested.6 6 Thus, the rights of the
detainee would be preserved and the present process of mechan-
ically acquiring the prosecutor's approval would be terminated. 67
Court approval would also provide a legal check on the question-
able medical admission procedure,68 just as the hearing in non-
64 See notes 27- 29 and accompanying text supra.
6 This is not to be confused with the lesser standard of mere dangerousness, the
requisite standard for invoking emergency detention.
66 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 21-523 to -527, -541 (1967). This statutory procedure pro-
vides for close judicial supervision over the emergency detention process. Detention must
be terminated at the end of forty-eight hours unless the hospital administrator petitions the
court for an order authorizing seven days of continued hospitalization for emergency
observation and diagnosis. Within twenty-four hours of receiving this petition the court
will order continued hospitalization or the detainee's release after evaluating the officer's
report, the physicians's report and any other relevant material. If further hospitalization is
ordered the court will grant a hearing within twenty-four hours of a detainee's request. At
the conclusion of the seven days of hospitalization the hospital will petition the court to
commence formal proceedings or release the detainee.
67 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
68 See notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
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emergency involuntary commitment proceedings reviews the
findings of the examining physicians.0 9
Third, the statute should provide that a hospital can admit an
individual pursuant to a police officer's emergency detention pow-
er only upon a finding of the examining physician that the in-
dividual is mentally ill and dangerous. It appears that some hospi-
tals will now admit an individual under these circumstances mere-
ly upon a finding that he is mentally ill. Hospital admission
policies cannot be relied upon to serve as a filtering mechanism to
reduce alleged detention. The standard for hospital admission
pursuant to the emergency detention power should be the same as
that imposed upon a police officer invoking the power.
Fourth, it is also suggested that the responsibility for com-
mencing formal commitment proceedings be shifted from the po-
lice officer to a physician at the receiving hospital. Such a change
would encourage a more extensive psychiatric examination by the
hospital staff and result in a more meaningful decision to com-
mence proceedings than leaving this responsibility to the police
officer.
Fifth, the right to begin treatment during the forty-eight hour
detention period should be withdrawn. This period should instead
be utilized for further diagnosis and examination directed toward
determining the need for commitment since no justification for
initiating treatment exists before a judicial determination of the
validity of detention.
The possibilities of unlawful detention and the subsequent com-
mencement of unwarranted treatment and extended detention
pending commmitment proceedings clearly exist. Therefore, cer-
tain modifications in the statutory scheme are needed. The loss of
liberty, whether resulting from alleged criminal acts or from ac-
tions that apparently authorize emergency detention, is too great
an injury to suffer at the hands of the state without the opportu-
nity to confront those alleging the statutory grounds for arrest or
detention. Similarly, additional statutory safeguards must be pro-
vided to prevent detention upon an erroneous initial determination
by the police officer. Only when the statute provides the right to
confrontation and other procedural safeguards will it preserve the
necessary balance between the rights of the indivdiual and the
interests of society.
69 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (Supp. 1971). See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 21-522
(1967) where hospital admission is authorized only if the admitting doctor certifies that he
has examined the person and is of the opinion that he has symptoms of mental illness and
as a result thereof is likely to injure himself or others, unless immediately hospitalized.
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Unfortunately, though the statutory changes suggested here
may be deemed a necessary end in themselves, the inherent
problems of psychiatric detention transcend the prescriptive lan-
guage of a code. Proper adherence to required procedure will only
be accomplished when police training produces officers better
prepared to detect mental illness and more proficient in dealing
with the special problems they will encounter with the mentally
ill. Similarly, only when judges make more extensive investiga-
tions of facts and carefully review medical reports to determine
the sufficiency of examination techniques before authorizing psy-
chiatric detention or commitment will their roles in the com-
mitment process be fulfilled. Finally, until the facilities of the
general receiving hospital are improved, until state hospitals are
properly staffed and, most importantly, until a greater sensitivity
of the institution to the particular needs of the mentally ill is
achieved, statutory language, no matter how precise and carefully
drawn, will prove ineffective.
-Mark F. Mehlman
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